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SHORT ARTICLE

Man Bites Blue Dog: Are Moderates Really More
Electable than Ideologues?
Stephen M. Utych, Boise State University

Are ideologically moderate candidates more electable than ideologically extreme candidates? Historically, both research
in political science and conventional wisdom answer yes to this question. However, given the rise of ideologues on both
the right and the left in recent years, it is important to consider whether this assumption is still accurate. I ﬁnd that, while
moderates have historically enjoyed an advantage over ideologically extreme candidates in congressional elections, this
gap has disappeared in recent years, where moderates and ideologically extreme candidates are equally likely to be elected.
This change persists for both Democratic and Republican candidates.

A

re moderates more electable than ideologues? Conventional wisdom and existing political science research suggest that, yes, moderate candidates should
be more electable in a general election than ideologically extreme candidates. Classic studies of candidate positioning suggest that, in a general election, politicians should compete for
the median voter to win, leading to a candidate who is ideologically moderate (Downs 1957). However, in recent years,
strongly ideological candidates have risen and achieved varying levels of success, from Tea Party–supported conservative
Republicans to very liberal Democrats, as evidenced by the
insurgent presidential campaign of Bernie Sanders, while there
are fewer ideologically moderate candidates. Blue Dog or moderate Democrats are shrinking in numbers in the US House
of Representatives, declining from 54 after the 2008 election
to 26 after 2010, down to just 14 after the 2014 elections. Indeed, over time, Republican-elected ofﬁcials are becoming more
conservative, while Democratic-elected ofﬁcials are becoming
slightly more liberal (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).
However, it is important to explain whether moderates are
still more likely to be elected than ideological candidates. There
are multiple competing explanations for the rise of ideologues
in Congress: redistricting has made congressional districts more
ideologically homogenous (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2005), voter decision making in primaries may be chang-

ing (Owen and Grofman 2006), ideologically extreme candidates are becoming more successful in primaries (Brady, Han,
and Pope 2007), and, at least among partisan individuals, the
public is becoming more ideologically polarized (Lelkes 2016).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that ideologues may be performing better today than they have historically, but little large-scale
empirical work has been done to demonstrate whether this is
occurring in a systematic way.

HOW IDEOLOGY CAN INFLUENCE
ELECTORAL SUCCESS
Scholars and the media alike have consistently proclaimed a
truth about electoral politics—ideologically extreme candidates are simply less electable than moderates. Indeed, classic
work on electoral incentives for politicians has claimed that
candidates should appeal to the median voter, who is likely to
be ideologically moderate (Downs 1957). Voters have traditionally been shown to prefer moderate candidates to extreme
candidates in general elections (see Burden 2004). However,
evidence also exists to suggest that primary voters tend to
prefer ideological, rather than moderate, candidates (Brady
et al. 2007), although primary voters may also take strategic
concerns into account (Mirhosseini 2015). While ideologues
may be more successful in primaries, they have been shown to
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be less successful in general elections (Hall and Snyder 2015).
When ideological candidates win primaries, this leads to a decrease in the probability of their party winning the election,
compared to moderate candidates (Hall 2015). Findings that
there has traditionally been a trade-off between electability and
ideology in elections are generally strong and robust.
However, an extreme ideology does not always cause candidates to suffer electorally. Traditionally, this has been demonstrated in primary elections, where the median voter for the
primary is ideologically more extreme than the median voter
in the general election. States with closed primaries limited to
registered partisans tend to offer more ideologically extreme
candidates than areas with open or semi-open primaries (Gerber
and Morton 1998). This still suggests that candidates appeal to
the median voters but that they may have different constituencies. Grofman (2004) argues this very point, suggesting the
within-party median is a more likely goal for candidates to
appeal to than the district median. In recent years, incumbents, especially those in districts that ideologically favor the
other party, have seen their traditional incumbency advantage
decrease (Jacobsen 2015). This suggests that what we understand about elections may be changing, and traditional predictors of candidate success may be less relevant today.
Why might the electability versus ideology conﬂict be disappearing? One obvious answer is the rise of the Tea Party
and ideological purity within the Republican Party, followed
temporally by the rise of Bernie Sanders Democrats. Tea Party
activity tends to actually increase support for even mainstream
Republican candidates (Rapoport 2015). Essentially, ideological extremity seems to no longer be a fringe element but is
being pushed to the mainstream. Partisans do not punish ideological extremity within their own party—the primary backlash toward ideologically extreme candidates tends to come
from independents and out-partisans (Stone 2017). Additionally, parties may be behaving in a strategic manner. The most
competitive districts for a party should be “outlier” districts—
those with a Republican (Democratic) advantage in the electorate but a moderate Democrat (Republican) serving as the
representative. These districts are most ripe for partisan change
and may attract more ideologically extreme candidates to replace the current ideologically moderate representatives (Brunell, Grofman, and Merrill 2016).
Another explanation for increased success of ideological
candidates is a change in voter preferences. Polarization in the
mass public is a hotly debated topic among political scientists.
With a focus on issue consistency (i.e., individuals consistently taking liberal or conservative positions across a variety
of issues), scholars have found a substantial increase in polarization from the 1980s to the present day (Abramowitz
2010). Others argue that American voters simply appear to
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be becoming more polarized, because of an increase in ideologically polarized candidates, and remain generally moderate on most issues (Fiorina 2004). If voters are indeed adopting more extreme policy preferences, the rise of ideological
candidates simply follows a change in voter preferences. On
the contrary, candidates for ofﬁce may simply be becoming
more ideologically extreme, while voter preferences remain
largely unchanged.
There is some additional nuance needed to evaluate the
idea that voter preferences may be changing. Individuals are
much better ideologically sorted into their preferred party
today than they have been in the past, leading to an increased
correlation between ideology and party (Levendusky 2009;
Noel 2014). Indeed, this correlation has more than doubled
between 1972 and 2012 (Lelkes 2016). This has also lead to
increased voter loyalty toward a preferred party (Abramowitz
and Webster 2016). Additionally, affective polarization, or
dislike of the out-party, has risen simultaneously with partisan sorting (Lelkes 2016; Mason 2018). While a debate exists
about the extent to which the public is becoming polarized,
it does seem that polarization of the electorate is occurring
to some extent and that this is heightened among more intense partisans.
Nonacademics involved in campaigns and the media frequently bemoan how ideology and electability must be balanced, as shown dramatically in hacked Democratic National
Committee e-mails that encouraged the elevation of “Pied
Piper” Republican candidates, such as Donald Trump, Ted
Cruz, and Ben Carson, in the 2016 presidential election, who
were viewed as more ideological than their competitors (Sainato 2016). Regardless of whether ideological candidates are
less electable, it appears political operatives believe that they
are. This leads to a one main hypothesis—over time, ideologically extreme candidates are becoming increasingly likely
to win election, while moderates are becoming less likely to
win. Because of an array of potential changes that are likely
to work together, such as partisan sorting, less competitive
districts, and changes to voter ideology, ideological candidates
are seeing increasing electoral success.

METHOD AND RESULTS
Using data from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics,
and Elections (DIME; Bonica 2013) from 1980 to 2012, I am
able to test the effect of ideology on electability over time.
Bonica’s (2013) database uses campaign contributors to estimate ideology scores of candidates. This provides an advantage over other measures, like DW-NOMINATE scores, in that
it does not require that candidates achieve election to Congress
in order for their ideologies to be estimated.
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Figure 1. Ideology and electability, 1980–2012

Figure 2. Ideology and vote share, 1980–2012

This data set allows me to measure the effect of candidate
ideology on the likelihood of a candidate winning an election.1
I use Bonica’s (2014) CFscore to measure ideology, where
higher values indicate more liberal ideology, and lower values
indicate more conservative ideology.2 Since I am interested
in only strength, rather than direction, of ideology, I collapse
this into a one-tailed measure, Ideological Extremity, which
ranges from 0.001 (most moderate) to 4.981 (most extreme).
This measure has a mean value of 0.826, with a standard
deviation of 0.388. I also include a time variable, Year, which is
coded from 0 (1980) to 32 (2012), to capture the year in which
an election occurred. To test my prediction that ideologues
are becoming increasingly likely to be elected over time, I
interact the variables Ideological Extremity and Year.
I examine two dependent variables available in the Bonica
(2013) data set. The ﬁrst is an indicator variable, Winning
Election, which takes a value of 1 if a candidate won election in
a given year and 0 otherwise. I additionally examine the total
vote share in the general election, Vote Share, attained by a
candidate. This variable ranges from 0 to 100, with a mean of
53.41 and a standard deviation of 20.33. In these analyses,
I also include controls for partisanship, whether the candidate is an incumbent, whether a seat is open, logged candidate
campaign spending, and the ideological composition of the

district.3 Models include state-level ﬁxed effects, and standard
errors are clustered at the congressional district-year level.
Results of these analyses are presented graphically in ﬁgure 1.
The results for ideological extremity’s effect on the probability of winning an election provide support for my hypothesis. I ﬁnd that ideological candidates are becoming increasingly likely to win US House elections over time, while
moderate candidates are becoming increasingly less likely to
win. I ﬁnd that ideologically extreme candidates are indeed
less likely to win than moderates but that this effect gets
smaller over time during the study period. These results suggest that ideologically extreme candidates are very unlikely to
win elections at the start of the study period, while moderates
were quite likely to win—very extreme candidates were less
than 20% likely to win election in 1980, while ideologically
moderate candidates were nearly 80% likely to win. However,
around 2008, ideologically extreme candidates and moderates became indistinguishable in their likelihood of winning
an election, with predicted probabilities of winning hovering
around 50% for both. This provides support to the hypothesis that ideologically extreme candidates are becoming more
likely to win House elections over time.
Results for ideological extremity’s effect on vote share are
displayed in ﬁgure 2 and present a similar pattern to probability of winning. In 1980, an ideologically extreme candidate was expected to win only about 40% of the vote, while a
moderate candidate was predicted to win over 60%. These
numbers move closer to 50% each over time, again crossing in

1. Here, analyses are limited to general elections only. I restrict analyses
to US House elections only. I additionally remove candidates who are not
members of the Republican or Democratic Parties, as these candidates rarely
win elections and are likely to have incentives different from candidates of
major parties.
2. The CFscore is computed using campaign contributions, where a
common pool of contributions across elections allows Bonica (2014) to
estimate ideology of candidates using the ideology of campaign contributors, who are presumed to be ideologically proximate to those they donate
to. For elected candidates, the CFscore correlates highly (r p :92) to roll
call voting measures of ideology (Bonica 2014).

3. This variable is calculated by taking the previous presidential vote
share in the district and collapsing it (since candidate ideology is measured
only by strength), to range theoretically from 0 (completely voted for
candidate of one party) to .5 (a tie between both major party candidates).
In practice, this variable ranges from 0.04 to 0.5, with a mean of 0.395 and
a standard deviation of 0.084.
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Figure 3. Ideology and electability, 1980–2012: Republicans

Figure 4. Ideology and electability, 1980–2012: Democrats

2008. By 2012, ideologically extreme candidates are predicted
to have a slight (although not statistically distinguishable)
advantage in both vote share and probability of winning, compared to moderates.
As examples, the strongest ideologues early in the study
period include Richard Ferraro of California, who received 28%
of the vote, Leo Yambrek of Alabama (18%), and Anthony
Pollina of Vermont (27%). In 2010 and 2012, while most strong
ideologues still did not win, victorious ideologues include
Democrat Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin and Republican Jim
Graves of Georgia.
Figures 3 and 4 present results for ideology and probability of winning an election, broken down by candidate party.4
As demonstrated in the ﬁgures, this effect persists for both
Republicans and Democrats (and is actually slightly larger for
Democrats). In the early years of the study period, ideologues
were incredibly unlikely to be elected, while moderates were
highly likely to be elected. By 2010, the difference between
moderates and ideologically extreme candidates was indistinguishable, suggesting that moderates and ideologically extreme candidates were equally likely to be elected during this
time. This suggests that it is not simply a single party driving
these results but that Democrats and Republicans who are
ideologically extreme enjoy similar improvements in their electoral fortunes over the study period.

both scholars and practitioners of politics. It suggests that
the correlation between ideological moderation and electoral
success is considerably weaker than research and conventional wisdom have shown in the past.
Of course, this does not mean that politicians and pundits are necessarily wrong to suggest that parties should avoid
candidates who are too ideological. Moderates and ideologues
are similarly likely to win elections today. I have not demonstrated that ideologues are overall advantaged compared
to moderates, simply that they are no longer disadvantaged.
This research also does not address the underlying mechanism for this change. District composition and voter preferences may have a vital impact on electoral success, and
practitioners of politics should consider these factors, as there
are likely to be areas where moderates remain advantaged
and, similarly, areas where ideologues may have an advantage. Further research is required to adjudicate the mechanism
through which ideologues have been enjoying greater electoral success in recent years.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
I demonstrate that, while ideologues have historically been
electorally disadvantaged, compared to moderates, this gap
has shrunk over time, to the point where an ideologically extreme and moderate candidate are now roughly equally likely
to be elected to Congress. This research has consequences for

4. Regression tables are available in the online appendix. Similar results
are obtained for analyses using vote share as the dependent variable.
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